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AbsTrACT
Community mobilisation interventions have been used 
to promote health in many low-income and middle-
income settings. They frequently involve collective action 
to address shared determinants of ill-health, which 
often requires high levels of participation to be effective. 
However, the non-excludable nature of benefits produced 
often generates participation dilemmas: community 
members have an individual interest in abstaining from 
collective action and free riding on others’ contributions, 
but no benefit is produced if nobody participates. For 
example, marches, rallies or other awareness-raising 
activities to change entrenched social norms affect the 
social environment shared by community members 
whether they participate or not. This creates a temptation 
to let other community members invest time and effort. 
Collective action theory provides a rich, principled 
framework for analysing such participation dilemmas. 
Over the past 50 years, political scientists, economists, 
sociologists and psychologists have proposed a plethora 
of incentive mechanisms to solve participation dilemmas: 
selective incentives, intrinsic benefits, social incentives, 
outsize stakes, intermediate goals, interdependency 
and critical mass theory. We discuss how such incentive 
mechanisms might be used by global health researchers 
to produce new questions about how community 
mobilisation works and conclude with theoretical 
predictions to be explored in future quantitative or 
qualitative research.
InTroduCTIon
In Rules for Radicals, legendary community organ-
iser Saul Alinsky asserted that efforts to mobilise 
communities were bound to fail if activists did not 
appeal to community members’ self-interest.1 By 
‘self-interest’, Alinsky was not only referring to 
material or ‘selfish’ interests, but to any motivation 
that compelled individuals to act.1 In contemporary 
discourse, we might call such a force an incentive. 
we describe a theoretical framework for concep-
tualising the mechanisms through which commu-
nity members may be incentivised to participate in 
community mobilisation interventions at a grass-
roots level.
Community participation is an important concern 
in global health, in which it is enshrined as a right 
and social good by the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration. 
Societal and systemic improvement, healthcare 
provision and disease control are a shared respon-
sibility of policy, governance, public, private and 
third sector stakeholders. The enactment of this 
responsibility is influenced by individual and collec-
tive efforts, including advocacy and lobbying, which 
originate in diverse communities. At the grassroots 
level community participation is argued to facilitate 
the sustainability of health programmes,2 improve 
fit between programme objectives and local needs3 
and tackle cultural, societal and environmental 
barriers to health that are costly or impractical to 
address through other means.4 5
Community mobilisation interventions are 
frequently initiated to promote community partic-
ipation.6 As they are complex interventions that 
involve multiple, recursive feedback loops and 
emergent outcomes, their evaluation has become a 
feature of global and public health discussion.7–11 
They can be defined as interventions in which local 
individuals collaborate with external agents in 
identifying, prioritising and tackling the causes of 
ill-health based on values of bottom-up leadership 
and empowerment.4 12
For example, participatory women’s groups have 
been used in Nepal, India, Malawi and Bangladesh 
to promote maternal and newborn health.13 In 
these interventions, a trained peer facilitator leads 
group members through a participatory learning 
and action cycle in which they prioritise, plan and 
implement strategies to address local health prob-
lems.14 A meta-analysis of trials of this approach 
suggested that it was associated with a 20% popula-
tion-level reduction in neonatal mortality.13 Other 
applications of community mobilisation include 
community monitoring of health services,15 sex 
worker collectivisation to promote sexual health,16 
self-help groups to prevent intimate partner 
violence17 and village health clubs to address 
hygiene and sanitation.18
These interventions typically involve non-spe-
cialist community members in grassroots collec-
tive action for the benefit of the community. 
For example, women’s groups in rural Malawi, 
India and Bangladesh organised health educa-
tion sessions, community ambulance services, and 
mobile clinics.19–22 Community members in rural 
Uganda monitored and reported on health worker 
performance to local health committees.15 Members 
of health and sanitation clubs in rural Zimbabwe 
dug latrines and garbage pits and conducted home 
visits to monitor each other’s construction work.18 
Self-help groups in South Africa conducted a sit-in 
at a local police station for poor service, established 
curfews on the sale of liquor & a ban on alcohol 
sales to adolescents, and coordinated rape preven-
tion meetings between village stakeholders.23 24
Whether attending a protest, joining a self-
help group or enlisting as a volunteer, a high 
level of participation in collective action is plau-
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intervention contexts, but participation varies. A meta-analysis 
of trials of participatory women’s groups to prevent maternal 
and neonatal mortality found that attendance ranged from 2% 
to 51% of the target population. It also showed a linear relation-
ship between the proportion of women attending group meet-
ings and population impact, as well as a minimum need for 30% 
group attendance to produce impacts on mortality.13
PArTICIPATIon dIlemmAs In CommunITy mobIlIsATIon
A need for high levels of participation in collective action to 
produce shared benefits often generates social dilemmas.25 In 
The Logic of Collective Action, Mancur Olson pointed out that, 
when large numbers of participants are required to achieve a 
shared outcome, the personal impact of a single participant is 
small relative to the cost of participation.26 The implication is 
that individuals will have an interest in abstaining from partic-
ipating in collective action and free riding on others’ contribu-
tions, even if no benefit is produced if nobody participates. We 
might call this phenomenon, a ‘participation dilemma’.
For example, a community mobilisation programme to 
promote sexual health in urban India organised sex workers into 
collectives which conducted a number of disruptive protests, 
including rallies, hunger strikes and gherao (encirclement of 
public buildings), to oppose street violence and raise aware-
ness of sex workers’ rights.27 Participation in such protests 
involved considerable risks of violent backlash, yet all resident 
sex workers benefited, whether or not they participated. It was 
impossible for participants to exclude non-participants from 
enjoying greater community awareness of sex workers’ rights: in 
economic terms, awareness-raising was a non-excludable good.
Collective action in community mobilisation interventions 
typically produces such non-excludable goods. Rural commu-
nity members holding health services accountable for deficient 
performance cannot exclude non-participants from enjoying the 
benefits of improved service quality.15 Self-help groups estab-
lishing a curfew on the sale of liquor and a ban on alcohol sales 
to adolescents cannot exclude non-members from benefiting 
from reduced risks of alcohol use.23 24 Members of health and 
sanitation clubs seeking to reduce transmission of waterborne 
disease cannot exclude non-members from enjoying the bene-
fits.18 Members of women’s groups lobbying health authorities 
for staff at mobile health clinics cannot ask for these workers to 
exclude non-members from their services.19 In some contexts, 
simply attending a women’s group produces non-excludable 
benefits by challenging deeply held cultural norms mandating 
women’s physical seclusion and confinement to the home.28
In other situations, the direct benefits are excludable, but 
sharing still occurs out of altruism. For example, members 
of women’s groups invested considerable time and effort in 
lobbying donors to pay for bicycle ambulances, monitoring and 
maintaining bicycle quality and operating shifts to take patients 
to hospital.19 In principle, they could have made a profit on their 
bicycle ambulance service, but in practice it was provided for 
free or only charged for at the bare minimum to cover produc-
tion costs.19 Free rider problems still exist in these examples. 
Altruistic community members may all care about increasing 
access to emergency transport for residents in need, but each 
member has an individual temptation to let others do the work 
in setting up and maintaining the ambulance service. In social 
psychology, this is related to ‘the bystander effect’,29 whereby 
individuals observing an emergency incident, such as a mugging 
or a rape, are less likely to help the afflicted person, the more 
bystanders are present who could potentially help.
mATerIAl InCenTIves for PArTICIPATIon?
To solve participation dilemmas, global health researchers have 
grappled with whether to provide material incentives, such as 
cash benefits for participation.28 Community members are often 
vocal about their desires for benefits from participation and may 
explicitly attribute lack of commitment to insufficient material 
incentives.18 30 31 Attendance rates at women’s groups in rural 
Nepal increased from <40% to over 90% when cash or food 
transfers were provided at group meetings.28 Development 
researchers have also noted how community members suffering 
from ‘participation fatigue’ have withdrawn from projects after 
being asked repeatedly to contribute in the absence of personal 
benefit.32 33
Many debates over the use of incentives for community 
mobilisation mirror arguments over their use in community 
health worker programmes.34 Some have asserted that people in 
extreme poverty should be provided material incentives to tackle 
structural vulnerabilities preventing them from participating.35 36 
Others have contended that the resulting participation is token-
istic, opportunistic and unsustainable, and makes interventions 
more costly to deliver.32 37
Nonetheless, community mobilisation interventions differ 
critically from community health worker programmes in their 
emphasis on community members themselves identifying, 
prioritising and owning solutions to local health problems. 
For example, external agents cannot simply pay community 
members to operate a bicycle ambulance service from the start as 
this would undermine the very process of reflection, conception 
and action thought key to community empowerment.38
At most, external agents can facilitate the collectivisation 
process by supplying trained facilitators to create safe spaces 
for dialogue and reflection,4 23 providing material incentives for 
attendance28 39 or supplying a budget for groups to administer 
as they see fit.40 None of these approaches dispel fundamental 
dilemmas between self-interest and collective interest in subse-
quent decisions to participate in collective action to address local 
health problems.
solvIng PArTICIPATIon dIlemmAs: CAn ColleCTIve 
ACTIon Theory helP?
Collective action theory41 provides a rich, principled frame-
work for analysing social dilemmas in collective action. It has 
been tested in research on political protest,42 voting,43 union 
membership26 and participation in social movements,44 in which 
it has been extremely influential. It is well-known for its appli-
cation to environmental politics,45 in which it seeks to address 
Hardin’s46 ‘tragedy of the commons’. A large international 
effort in psychology, economics and social anthropology is also 
underway using experimental games informed by collective 
action theory to measure cross-cultural variation in cooperation 
and conflict.47 48 These place participants in artificial dilemmas 
involving real financial stakes where they have to choose between 
their own and their collective interest. The same games are used 
increasingly to measure trust and cooperation in international 
development projects.49 50
As of October 2018, Olson’s The Logic of Collective Action 
had garnered over 40 000 citations on Google Scholar, but it 
does not seem to have made much of a mark on global health 
research. While collective action-oriented interventions are 
frequently deployed and evaluated in global health,16 17 37 51 52 
existing studies have, to our knowledge, paid less attention to 
potential conflicts of interest between individual self-preserva-
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Table 1 Proposed solutions to participation dilemmas
solution explanation examples
A. Selective incentives Tangible rewards for participants, or penalties for non-
participants
Stipends for volunteers; free food, training or entertainment for group members; 
education on 'hook topics' that are unrelated to the primary purpose of a self-help 
group to attract participants.
B. Social incentives Incentives generated by social interaction with other 
community members
Opportunities for building individual social capital, displays of approval of 
participation or disapproval of non-participation by community members.
C. Outsize stakes, intermediate 
goals, interdependency
Situations in which the incentive structure does not 
produce a participation dilemma
A wealthy patron willing to build a clean water supply for the whole village; a 
health and sanitation club satisfied with raising awareness rather than changing 
behaviours; a troupe of activist street theatre performers who depend on each 
other for success.
D. Intrinsic benefits Psychological or moral rewards for participation or 
penalties for non-participation
The benefits of being able to express outrage, gain a sense of agency, feel part of 
a greater cause, feel less lonely, express one's identity, show solidarity or perform 
one's moral duty.
E. Critical mass An initial group of highly motivated participants sets off a 
chain reaction that rapidly drives further participation up
A small, initial group of street protesters against police inaction on violence 
against women successfully convince authorities to take action on a case of 
domestic violence, thereby persuading other community members to join future 
protests.
yielded only two studies concerning a global health issue,53 54 
while a 2018 review in the Annual Review of Psychology on 
social mobilisation research55 only referenced a single study on 
health behaviour.56
At a minimum, therefore, we have an opportunity to consider 
the use of collective action theory more widely in global health. 
Of particular interest to health programming are an impres-
sive number of proposed solutions to the free rider problem 
that have accumulated over the past 50 years; political scientist 
Lichbach57 listed no fewer than 39 potential mechanisms. Global 
health researchers might usefully employ these to ‘open the 
black box’58 of community mobilisation and pose more nuanced 
questions about how interventions achieve—or fail to achieve—
their aspirations.
Before discussing the range of proposed solutions, we empha-
sise that we are not making evidenced claims for their efficacy. 
Each solution is far from perfect and is by no means a recipe for 
generating collective action. We outline theory, not to provide 
answers, but to point researchers towards a broader range of 
questions.
solvIng PArTICIPATIon dIlemmAs: A TheoreTICAl 
frAmework
Table 1 summarises proposed solutions to participation dilemmas 
from collective action theory, divided into five general groups.
(A) Selective incentives are tangible rewards for contributors 
or penalties for non-contributors, which incentivise participa-
tion by making individuals personally lose out if they free ride.26 
In community mobilisation interventions, participants are often 
offered stipends for volunteer outreach35 or financial training 
or microcredit loans for joining self-help groups.36 39 Literacy 
classes,59 free food,30 reimbursement of travel costs30 or oppor-
tunities for games and entertainment21 at group meetings also 
fall into this category. As community members decide on their 
own strategies for health promotion in community mobilisation 
interventions, such incentives cannot be provided for specific 
health behaviours, but they may still form part of a larger solu-
tion by encouraging meeting attendance.
(B) Social incentives arise from participants’ interactions with 
other community members. They often invoke ideas about social 
norms, reputation and social capital. For example, social norms 
may lead group or community members to actively display 
approval of participants and disapproval of non-participants.60 
Participation may serve as a costly signal for 'good character' and 
help establish a favourable reputation in the wider community;61 
this may in turn confer future benefits of trust and coopera-
tion. Participation may also help build relationships with other 
community members that can be leveraged for future social 
support, that is, ‘individual social capital’.62
Such incentives may be particularly likely to be generated 
when group members collaborate in the production of ‘club 
benefits’57: benefits that are collectively owned by members, but 
exclude the community at large. For example, women’s groups 
sometimes established mutual funds for emergency healthcare, to 
which members contributed to generate a pool of savings.63 Since 
access to funds was controlled by group members,19 63 women 
probably needed to maintain strong relationships with other 
members to retain access. At the same time, the funds required 
frequent group interaction that might produce internal norms of 
approval for participation and disapproval for free riding. This 
would in turn strengthen women’s incentive to maintain a repu-
tation for contributing a fair share to group work.
(C) Outsize stakes, intermediate goals and interdependent 
groups are means by which the need for collective action may 
not involve a participation dilemma. Some individuals may 
have such an outsize stake in addressing a particular public issue 
that they are willing to either bear the full cost of supplying the 
non-excludable good or contribute to it despite their personal 
impact being small relative to personal cost.64 For example, a 
wealthy patron might be willing to build a clean water supply 
for his whole village, or a politically well-connected commu-
nity member may be able to lobby for policy change on behalf 
of the community. Individuals may also see sufficient value in 
realising easily achievable intermediate goals that the achieve-
ment of the final goal is less important.64 For example, a health 
and sanitation club may be satisfied with raising awareness 
rather than changing behaviours in the short-term. Collective 
actions involving small, interdependent groups also pose less of 
a participation dilemma. When each individual contribution is 
essential to the end result, a single free rider would compromise 
the whole enterprise.26 For example, a small troupe of activist 
street theatre performers may depend intimately on each other 
for success. In general, when personal contributions make large, 
unique impacts, social dilemmas pose less of a problem.
(D) Intrinsic benefits or ‘expressive’ or ‘symbolic’ benefits65 
are psychological or moral benefits that are intrinsic to the act 
of participating, unlike ‘instrumental benefits’ that accrue as a 









unity Health: first published as 10.1136/jech-2018-211045 on 30 October 2018. Downloaded from 
93Gram L, et al. J Epidemiol Community Health 2019;73:90–96. doi:10.1136/jech-2018-211045
Theory and methods
oriented towards obtaining instrumental benefits. Intrinsic bene-
fits include gaining a sense of agency, feeling part of a greater 
cause, expressing outrage, feeling the ‘warm glow’ of helping 
others, feeling less lonely, expressing one’s identity, showing soli-
darity or performing one’s moral duty.66 Some political scien-
tists have asserted that intrinsic benefits are the only rational 
incentive for participation in voting given the vanishing likeli-
hood of any single vote changing the outcome of an election.65 
Many intrinsic benefits depend on individual perceptions of 
community issues; thus, skilled communication and ‘framing’67 
of issues is crucial for activating them as motivations for collec-
tive action. For example, feminist microcredit non-government 
organisations in rural India successfully coordinated a number 
of large-scale protests against witch-hunts among tribal women 
by framing them as part of their struggle for independence from 
abusive husbands and exploitative employers.68
(E) Critical mass theory69 or ‘tipping point theory’70 involves 
a two-stage mechanism for solving participation dilemmas. First, 
highly motivated individuals who are willing to participate when 
few others have joined provide an initial critical mass. They may 
be incentivised by any of the mechanisms discussed above. Next, 
‘bandwagon effects’ may induce further participation and ideally 
set up a positive feedback loop that drives participation up.
Bandwagon effects may come from three sources. First, as 
more people join, individual costs and rewards may become 
more favourable.69 For example, attending a peer support group 
for people living with HIV may be deeply stigmatising for the 
first attendant, but increasingly socially acceptable as the group 
becomes bigger and more widely known. Second, the potential 
personal impact on collective success may increase.64 The first 
20 people who rally against female genital cutting in a village 
may be dismissed as outliers, but the next 20 who attend may 
be enough to worry community members that popular opinion 
is shifting. Third, individual participation may provide social 
proof to other community members of the value of partic-
ipating.71 Street protesters against police inaction on violence 
against women may persuade others to join future protests if 
they successfully convince authorities to take action on a specific 
case of violent abuse.
TowArds A fuTure reseArCh AgendA
Collective action theory raises many specific questions about the 
drivers of participation.
Does participation encourage or discourage future participa-
tion? Are individuals encouraged or discouraged from partic-
ipating themselves if they see others participate? If social 
incentives (scenario B) or bandwagon effects (scenario E) 
predominate, we might expect individuals to be encouraged by 
learning of others’ participation. Indeed, social psychologists 
have often asserted that information campaigns should avoid 
highlighting gaps in collective action on social issues, lest they 
inadvertently establish non-participation as a descriptive norm 
in community members’ minds.72 For example, an intervention 
providing households with information on their own and their 
neighbours’ electricity consumption to discourage electricity 
waste saw below-average households increase their consumption 
levels to match the descriptive norm.73
However, if individuals primarily participate to supply a 
non-excludable good (scenario C), we might expect them to be 
discouraged by widespread participation because opportunities 
to free ride become greater. For example, one study providing 
party activists for a major European election with informa-
tion about the canvassing intentions of their peers saw activists 
reducing their activity levels after learning that peers engaged in 
more canvassing than previously thought.74
Finally, if participation is motivated by selective incentives 
(scenario A) or intrinsic benefits (scenario D), the expected 
number of participants—everything else being equal—should 
have no effect on people’s decision to participate. Participation 
in collective action may not necessarily encourage future partic-
ipation, but may either encourage or discourage it depending on 
the underlying incentive mechanism.
Does demand for the non-excludable good matter? Folk 
wisdom holds that the greater the demand for a common good, 
the more likely it is that people will try to supply it. Marx 
famously theorised that oppressed people do not rise up against 
their oppressors because ‘false consciousness’ renders them 
unable to recognise the daily injustices they are subjected to.75 
Brazilian activist Paulo Freire76 prescribed group dialogue and 
reflection to foster a ‘critical consciousness’ among oppressed 
peoples to inspire collective action against such injustices.
However, collective action theorists have long questioned the 
obviousness of a link between shared grievances and participa-
tion in collective action.44 A 1983 Gallup poll showed that 40% 
of people in the USA believed it was likely that there would be 
nuclear war by 1998, and 70% believed they would not survive 
it, but only a very small fraction of citizens actively protested the 
proliferation of nuclear missiles in the 1980s.77
Our theoretical framework predicts that demand for a non-ex-
cludable good does not always affect participation rates. Partic-
ipation motivated by selective incentives, social incentives or 
bandwagon effects (scenarios A, B and E) should be little affected 
because these incentives can exist even without demand for the 
non-excludable good. Participation motivated by intrinsic bene-
fits (scenario D), on the other hand, probably increases with 
perceived need for the good as stronger grievances generate 
greater moral outrage or sense of duty. Evidently, participation 
motivated primarily by the desire to supply the non-excludable 
good (scenario C) increases with demand for it.
How are second-order participation dilemmas resolved? First-
order participation dilemmas are social dilemmas concerning 
the production of a non-excludable good: improved community 
hygiene and sanitation, community awareness about women’s 
rights, improved quality of health services, legislation and policy 
change. Second-order participation dilemmas are dilemmas 
concerning the production of social incentives to encourage 
participation in first-order collective action.
For example, community-led solutions to promote sanita-
tion and hygiene frequently involve social sanctions or mone-
tary fines for open defecation.78 While the need to encourage 
large numbers of community members to stop defecating in the 
open presents a first-order participation dilemma, the need to 
persuade the same community members to sanction other resi-
dents for defecating in the open presents a second-order partic-
ipation dilemma.
Each community member seeing their neighbour defecate in 
the open would have to admonish them repeatedly to change 
an ingrained habit. Similarly, fining a neighbour for defecating 
in the open requires a great deal of personal effort in involving 
the relevant authorities and carries personal risks of backlash. 
Even so, a single neighbour’s change in behaviour would have 
a negligible effect on the community’s overall risk of infectious 
disease—the costs of enforcing this social norm may outweigh 
its personal rewards. This creates a second-order participation 
dilemma in which each member is individually tempted to ignore 
instances of open defecation despite a collective interest in estab-
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While global health researchers routinely invoke social incen-
tives to explain participation in collective action,31 79 such 
explanations often assume away hidden second-order participa-
tion dilemmas. Understanding how second-order participation 
dilemmas are resolved may be useful for unlocking the potential 
of social incentives as a strategy for behaviour change.
Are some cultures better able to promote collective action 
than others? One of the most enduring theoretical constructs in 
cross-cultural psychology has been the distinction between indi-
vidualist and collectivist cultures.80 Individuals from collectivist 
cultures are thought to define themselves as part of a larger, inter-
dependent group and prioritise collective rather than individual 
goals.80 Non-Western cultures are often considered more collec-
tivist than Western cultures. Reviewing the marked differences 
in values, preferences and self-conceptions between cultures 
reported in existing literature, Henrich et al81 asked rhetorically 
whether standard Western samples of participants in mainstream 
psychology were some of the ‘weirdest people in the world?’
However, the direction of cultural difference does not consis-
tently point towards greater cooperation in collectivist cultures. 
While survey data from many non-Western cultures indicate 
more interdependent self-concepts and lower preferences for 
autonomy, data from experimental games involving real financial 
stakes indicate substantially greater conformity with economic 
models of rational self-interest maximisation.81 At the same 
time, forms of anticooperation have emerged in samples from 
societies such as Turkey, Korea and Oman, traditionally regarded 
as collectivist, where participants exact financial punishment on 
people who contribute to collective outcomes.81
Our own theoretical framework does not unambiguously 
predict greater capacity for collective action in collectivist 
cultures. If collectivist individuals place greater value on collec-
tive outcomes, demand for the collective good will increase, 
but—as noted above —this does not always translate into higher 
levels of participation. If internalised cultural values create 
intrinsic benefits to collective action (scenario D), social norms 
mandate informal social rewards or sanctions (scenario B), or 
(quasi-)legal institutions administer tangible rewards or sanctions 
(scenario A), we might expect enhanced capacities for collective 
action, but only if these incentives outweigh any contrary incen-
tives that deter participation.
lImITATIons
Concerns with empowerment and community-building are 
better served by normative rather than positive theories of 
participation.82 83 Many group processes fit awkwardly into a 
cost-benefit framework such as in-group/out-group categorisa-
tion,84 learning and socialisation in groups,85 collective cognitive 
biases86 87 and group emotion.88 Non-participation may arise for 
reasons other than free riding43: individuals may have no stake 
in a collective outcome or even be opposed to it. We do not 
advocate displacing the above concerns with a narrow focus on 
participation dilemmas.
ConClusIon
Community mobilisation has been successfully used to improve 
health in many low- and middle-income contexts,13 15–18  but 
our understanding of the mechanisms through which it achieves 
its outcomes is evolving. In this paper,  we suggested a theo-
retical framework for conceptualising the mechanisms through 
which participation in community mobilisation interventions 
happens. We see our framework as a pragmatic basis from which 
to pose more nuanced questions and help open the black box 
of community mobilisation. Collective action theorists tend to 
believe that large, poorly organised constituencies are routinely 
outmanoeuvred by smaller, better organised groups.89 Although 
community members rightly play a central role in the imple-
mentation of community mobilisation interventions, we cannot 
expect individuals taking volunteer time from their overbur-
dened lives to have all the answers to the manifold problems of 
mobilising, organising and delivering effective action. Heeding 
Alinsky’s call to think through community members’ motives for 
participation might move us one step closer towards this end.1
what is already known on this subject
 ► Community mobilisation is a complex social intervention 
producing emergent and often unpredictable outcomes.
 ► Community mobilisation often seeks to engender grassroots 
collective action to address shared determinants of ill-health, 
poverty and powerlessness.
 ► Grassroots collective action often requires high levels of 
participation to be effective.
what this study adds
 ► Collective action theory is well-known in the social sciences, 
but has been less explored in global and public health.
 ► Collective action theory provides a theoretical framework 
for maximising participation and minimising free riding in 
collective action.
 ► Collective action theory may enable a better understanding 
of how community mobilisation interventions achieve high 
levels of participation.
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